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TAXATION-INCOME TAX-EMBEZZLED FUNDS As INCOME-In the tax
year in question, the taxpayer embezzled funds that came into his hands in his
capacity as a bookkeeper for a transfer and warehouse company in Reno, Nevada.
He lost practically all of this money in various gambling houses. The taxpayer
was convicted and sentenced for the crime of embezzlement and was paroled in
1943. The Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was required to report
the amount embezzled in 1941 as income received in that year and asserted a
tax deficiency. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner 1 and the circuit
court of appeals reversed. 2 Held, the embezzled moneys did not constitute
income to the wrongdoer under section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Affirmed. Commissioner v. Wilcox, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 546.8
Most decisions, prior to the principal case, held that illegal gains were income
taxable to the wrongdoer. 4 Public policy seemed to be the motivating factor in
the courts' decisions rather than a consideration of whether.the gains fell within
the then current definition of what was income. 5 Thus the fact that a kidnapper
could have no possible right or title to ransom money was not considered important in deciding that such ransom money was income to the taxpayer.il While
the feeling has been voiced that it is beneath the dignity of the government to
have any dealings with wrongdoers, the overwhelming policy seemed to be that
everyone must share the tax burden-a wrongdoer is not permitted to use his
crime as a defense to taxation. 7 The principal case departs from that approach.
According to the majority of the Court, if one receives or takes money belongT.C. Memo. Dec., Aug. 21, 1944.
(C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 933.
8
Dissenting opinion of Justice Burton, principal case at 550.
4
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607 (1927) (unlawful liquor
business); Caldwell v. Comm., (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 488 ("kickbacks"
to school superintendent from contractors); Moore v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942)
131 F. (2d) 6u (illegal attorney-in-fact fees); McKenna, I B.T.A. 326 (1925)
(gambling gains); Voyer, 4 B.T.A. 1192 (1926) (lottery); Weiner, IO B.T.A. 905
(1928) (gambling gains); Poznak, 14 B.T.A. 727 (1928) (unlawful liquor business);
Rickard, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929) (illegal transportation of fight pictures); Slavin, 43
B.T.A. IIOO (1941) (gambling gains); National City Bank of New York (Estate
of O'Neil) v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 93 (illegal oil bonuses);
Barker v. Magruder, (C.C.A. D.C. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 122 (usurious interest); Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Comm., (C.C.A. 7th, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 990 (excessive
railroad fares); Humphreys, 42 B.T.A. 857 (1940) (protection money and ransom
payment); Kurrle v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 723 (embezzled
funds) contra: McKnight v. Comm., (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 572 (embezzled funds) .
5
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 at 263, 47 S. Ct. 607 (1927), Justice
Holmes wrote, "We see no reason to doubt the interpretation of the Act, or any reason
why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying the taxes that
if lawful it would have to pay."
6
Humphreys, 42 B.T.A. 857 (1940).
7
"That the winnings of a professional gambler, the loot of a burglar, the bribes
of a dishonest official, the wages of a prostitute, or the profits of any criminal commerce
should not be regarded as income, but should for reasons of public policy be regarded
as beneath the contempt of the law, is a proposition not without attraction." Steinberg
v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1926) 14 F. (2d) 564 at 566 (income from illegal sale
of liquor held taxable).
1
2
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ing to another, having no claim of right to it and being absolutely obligated to
'repay the money, it is not income to such person within the meaning of section
8
22 (a). Though the wrongdoer has most of the indices of ownership and
. treats the money as his own to the extent of losing it in Reno gambling houses,
it is still not income to him. 9 The principal case does not purport to overrule all
earlier decisions which held that gains from illegal businesses were income taxable to the wrongdoer. 10 The test proposed is, "that a taxable gain is conditioned
upon (I) the presence of a claim of right to the alleged gain and ( 2) the
absence of a definite unconditional obligation to repay or return that which would
otherwise constitute a gain." 11 This test cannot oe applied to some of the other
illegal transactions without arriving at the result reached in the principal case.12
Apart from this formal test, the result in the principal case seems to rest on the
idea of the absence of legal title in the embezzler to the misappropriated funds.
Only on this basis can the case of embezzled funds be reconciled with the result
re~ched in many other illegal transactions.18 Even this distinction will not
-reconcile the principal case. with all of the decided cases. 14 As Justice Burton
points out in his dissent, the majority opinion reads into section 22 (a) "a sharp
distinction between the embezzler and defrauder, exempting the former but
8
The majority grants that if the wrongdoer uses the embezzled money and
makes a profit, he would be taxable on this profit. Query: Would the majority hold this
to be the case if it could be shown that the wronged party could recover this profit
as well as the principal sum on equitable principles whereby the wrongdoer is considered a trustee of the embezzled money?
9 The government's contention, as stated, principal case at 548, was, "that the
act of appropriating the property of another to one's own use is an exercise of a major
power of ownership even though the act is consciously and entirely wrongful. As
against all the world except the true owner the embezzler is the legal owner, at least
while he remains in possession."
10 "The sole issue here is whether ·embezzled money constitutes taxable income to
the embezzler under Section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code." Principal case
at_ 548.
11
Principal case at 549.
12
Caldwell v. Comm., (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 488 (the court admitted· that the stat~ might have a cause of action against the school superintendent
to recover "kickbacks" received by him from building contractors, yet the gains were
, held to be income to the superintendent); McKenna, l B.T.A. 326 (1925) [gains
made by a bookmaker in gambling transactions which were declared void by Kentucky
law and which law gave the loser a right to restitution are taxable to, the bookmaker
under section 22 (a)]; Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Comm., 44 B.T.A. 445
(1941) (even though the taxpayer made restitution in a later year, he will not be
heard to say that amounts he received were in pursuance of an illegal contract and
hence did not constitute taxable income to him); National City Bank of New York
(Estate of O'Neil) v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 93 (recipient of
illegal oil bonuses taxed even though he made eventual restitution); Chicago R.I. &
P.R. Co. v. Comm., (C.C.A. 7th, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 990 (when a railroad collects
excessive fares, the excess is income even though the passengers have a theoretical right
to restitution).
13
See note 1 2, supra.
14 In Humphreys v. Comm., 42 B.T.A. 857 (1940), a kidnapper was taxed on
ransom money he received, It is clear that he had no more right or title to the ransom money than the taxpayer had to the embezzled funds in the principal case.
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not the latter." 15 In other words, the more heinous the crime (at least in the
eyes of the layman) the less likely that the criminal will be taxed on his illgotten
gains. This distinction seems wrong on principle. The majority apply the same
test in determining what is income to the thief as they apply to the honest businessman. "We fail to percieve any reason for applying different principles to a
situation where one embezzles or steals money from another." 16 This writer
can perceive reasons for applying a different test in these circumstances. The
Supreme Court's concept of income has evolved by the empiric process in cases
dealing with legitimate business enterprises. Indeed, the present concept of income has resulted in large part from attempts by the Court to distinguish between capital on the one hand and income on the other.17 These definitions and
tests should not be applied to a situation that is in no way analogous to the cases
that were being dealt with at the time they were developed. Criteria applicable
to the dealings of honest businessmen do not fit the embezzler or kidnapper.
Surely the thief's underworld associates would look upon the fruits of his embezzlement as income. Their test is not that he hplds the money under a claim of
right but rather that he has the use of the funds and the enjoyment such use
brings. In cases of tax avoidance, the Supreme Court, at least in recent years,
has not been slow to attribute income to the one who controls it or who receives
intangible as well as tangible benefits from it. 18 Why a more rigorous test should
be applied to a thief's gains is indeed difficult to understand. The language of
section 22 (a) is broad enough to include unlawful gains; 19 attempting to distinguish between various types of illegal gains on the basis of a bona fide claim
and the absence of an unconditional obligation to repay can hardly be said to
aid in the practical administration of the revenue laws. 20 Surely there is no
public policy to warrant it. 21

Milton D. Solonwn, S.Ed.

15

Principal case at 552.
16
Principal case at 549.
17
"In these cases, as well as those to be considered in the two following chapters,
the Court has been concerned with source in drawing the line between capital and
income, not in distiiiguishing legal from illegal operations." (Italics added). MAGILL,
TAXABLE INCOME 333 (1937).
18
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940); Helvering v.
Horst, 3u U.S. II2, 61 S. Ct. 144 (1940).
19
Justice Burton dissenting, principal case at 5 50, said: "The legislative history of
the section demonstrates the Congressional intent to tax not merely 'lawful' gains but
all gains lawful or unlawful." Justice Burton also points to the administrative interpretion of section 22 (a) to cover unlawful gains. See G.C.M. 16572, 15 INT. REv.
BuL. 82 (1936).
20
Justice Burton, principal case at 551, quotes from Justic~ Hand's opinion in
National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 93
at 96 as follows: "Although taxes are public duties attached to the ownership of property, the state should be able to exact their performance without being compelled to
take sides in private controversies. Possession is in general prima facie evidence of
ownership, and is perhaps indeed the source of the concept itself, though the time is
long past when it is synonymous with it. It would be intolerabl~ that the tax must be
assessed against both the putative tortfeasor :ind the claimant; collection of the revenue
cannot be delayed, nor should the Treasury be compelled to decide when a possessor's
claims are without legal warrant."
21
In principal case at 550, Justice Murphy writes, "Sanctioning a tax under the
circumstances before us would serve only to give the United States an unjustified pref-
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erence as to part of the money which rightfully and completely belongs to the taxpayer's employer." At p. 552, Justice Burton answers this argument, "This priority
of the tax lien is hardly an adequate argument to eliminate the tax itself. At most it is
an argument for Congress to modify the tax lien in favor of the victim." A further
answer to Justice Murphy's contention is that where the embezzler still has some of
the funds in his hands the government has no priority over the rightful owner, since
a court of equity would consider the. wrongdoer as trustee of such funds for the party
from whom the funds were misappropriated.

